Analysis of Kak's Quantum Cryptography Protocol from the Perspective of
  Source Strength by Akshay, Antony
1 
 
Analysis of Kak’s Quantum Cryptography Protocol from the 
Perspective of Source Strength 
 
Antony Akshay 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the performance of Kak’s quantum cryptography protocol when intensity 
monitoring is used to detect the presence of Eve during transmission. Some difficulties related to 
interception to obtain useful data from the transmission are discussed. The analysis shows the resilience 
of the protocol towards the man-in-the-middle attack. 
 
Introduction 
The field of quantum physics has opened up a new realm of cryptography. Quantum cryptography 
promises to offer perfect security if correctly implemented. The most prominent quantum cryptographic 
system is the BB84 [3] but now it is becoming clear that its implementation assumes unrealistic 
constraints which is why it has not turned out to be nearly as secure in practice [16],[17]. Basically, the 
problem with the implementation of BB84 is that it ideally requires that only one photon be transmitted 
for each key-bit and the detector be able to detect this single photon.  Practical systems transmit a 
bunch of photon that create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the eavesdropper.  
 
 In view of the difficulties of implementation of BB84, we consider Kak’s quantum 
cryptography protocol (K06 protocol) [2] which is based on qubit (or polarization) rotations.  Although 
qubit rotations [4]-[11] require careful control and knowledge of the initial state, the method still does 
not place the same constraints on sources and detectors as is required for BB84. We show that his 
protocol is resilient to the man-in-the-middle attack if intensity monitoring is use (which lends itself to 
this protocol in a natural fashion) and if the hash of the message to be sent is published.   
 
K06 Quantum Cryptography Protocol 
K06 was designed to transmit keys or data over the public channel between Alice (sender) and Bob 
(receiver.) Unlike BB84 that can only transmit keys, because of its slowness, the K06  protocol can be 
used to transmit whole messages [1]. This protocol involves the use of secret rotation transformations 
by both Alice and Bob that are not shared. Some considerations related to the protocol are given in the 
papers [12]-[14]. 
 
 When Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she codes the information into the polarization of 
a photon (the state X)  in a manner that is agreed upon in advance by Alice and Bob. Thus, for example, 
a horizontally polarized photon can be chosen to be the bit 0 and a vertically polarized photon can be 
the bit 1.  
 
 Alice applies her secret rotation UA(X) on the chosen photon (or photon stream) and then she 
sends it on to Bob who performs his secret transformation UB(X)  on the photon and sends it back to 
Alice.  Alice performs the inverse transformation (U-1A) and sends it back to Bob who performs (U-1B) 
thus recovering the message X. The protocol requires that  UAUB=UBUA (i.e.) they are commutative.  
U-1A*UA=I, U-1B*UB=I. Only Alice knows UA and U-1A, and only Bob knows UB and U-1B. 
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Figure 1. K06 protocol 
 
This is a description of what happens during each stage when we assume that some degree of intensity 
monitoring is implemented by both Alice and Bob. 
 
Stage 1. 
Alice has the message X that she wants to send to Bob and does not want anyone to eavesdrop on. So 
she applies her secret transformation UA on the message X, thereby creating UA(X). She then transmits 
this to Bob. The transmission can be over a secure or non-secure channel.  
 
X= Message 
UA= Alice's Transformation 
UA(X)= Message with Alice's transformation 
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Stage 2. 
In stage 2 of the protocol Bob now has received Alice's transmission, He takes a reading and there by 
destroys a certain amount of photons. This step is a precautionary step to check if someone is 
eavesdropping on their transmissions. Bob then applies his transformation UB on the message UA(X) 
and produces UAUB(X) this can also be written as UBUA(X) since UB and UA are commutative. He then 
transmits the new message to Alice. 
 
UA= Alice's Transformation 
UB= Bob's Transformation 
UBUA(X)= Message with Bob's and Alice's Transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 3. 
In stage three of the of the protocol, Alice receives the message and takes a power reading, this step is 
to check if the power level of the transmission is within acceptable levels. If it is within acceptable 
levels then there was no eavesdropper, otherwise there was an eavesdropper.  
 
After this is done Alice applies her secret inverse transformation (U-1A) to remove her transformation 
UA, thereby making the message UB(X), that is the message now only contains Bob's secret 
transformation. She then transmits this to Bob who in turn applies his secret inverse transformation on 
the message and retrieves the original message (X.) 
 
U-1A= Alice's Inverse Transformation 
U-1B= Bob's Inverse Transformation  
UB(X)=  Message with Bob's Transformation 
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The Man-in-the-Middle 
 
 
 The man-in-the-middle attack can happen in two different ways; the first way is when Eve tries 
to siphon off photons and use these photons to determine the message, and the second type of attack is 
when Eve tries to impersonate Alice. 
 
 In the K06 protocol, bits that are sent between Alice and Bob are carried by photons but it is not 
possible to generate one photon [4] at a specific time due to the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle. 
These photons are generated in burst of waves or pulses.  The pulses generated follow a Poisson 
distribution which is a good model to predict events based on average number of events (μ) known 
from previous history. The pulse might have only one photon but it is very unlikely.  
 
Suppose Alice is sending a message to Bob using the K06 protocol and Eve wants to listen in on 
the message, there is a way to detect if Eve is listening on the transmission. Alice and Bob do not know 
if the line is secure so Alice applies her secret transformation UA on the pulse (with N photons) and 
transmits to Bob. Eve in-order to eavesdrop has to siphon off a few number of photons (let’s say n is 
the number of photons that is necessary to measure polarization). The pulse now has N-n number of 
photons and Bob gets the pulse. The intensity of the light pulse will progressively decrease as it goes 
across the three stages. 
 
 In an intensity-aware implementation of the K06 protocol, let’s suppose the two parties use a 
certain fraction which is equal to N/4 photons.   Upon receiving the pulse Bob applies his secret 
transformation UB and siphons off a few to measure the intensity and in the process reduces the 
intensity to N-N/4 photons. Likewise, Alice checks the intensity and reduces it to N/2. Finally, for Bob 
the beam has intensity of N/4 after he has measured the value at his end. If E does eavesdropping, she 
would siphon off a large number of photons and both Alice and Bob would get to know that.  
 
 When Alice receives the transmission she can check the intensity to determine if someone was 
eavesdropping on the transmission. Alice can terminate the transmission or can transmit back to Bob if 
the Alice knows the power of the transmission is too low for Eve to make another reading. This is an 
example of converting the weakness of the protocol ( i.e. requiring multiple transmissions) to a strength 
by adding extra security. This three stage transmission is similar multi-located parties and provided an 
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innate protection against man in the middle attack [15]. 
 
 Eve can try to impersonate Alice and try to send her own message to Bob. However Alice can 
publish a public hash of her message and Bob only needs to check if the hashes of the message match. 
When Bob discovers that the hashes do not match, he knows immediately the message has been 
intercepted by Eve and replaced. The probability of the two different messages to have the same is hash 
is statistical extremely small. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis shows us that the K06 protocol is resilient to man-in-the-middle attack. Should it be 
known how many photons are needed to determine the polarization, one only needs to transmit at or 
below that threshold and Eve would not get anything useful by siphoning off the photons. 
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